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The question of criminal jurisdiction is one of
growing importance from the fact that a citizen of our State
can be seriously affected in his property rights, or even have
his life put in jeopardy, by the act of another living, a
thousand miles away, and in any one of fifty or mare sover-
eignties. If a citizen of the United States is killed by an
explosive compound sent by a citizen of Russia with an intent
to work that result in this country, it is a question of im-
portance in which country the guilty offender shall be punish-
ed. If a citizen of New York goes over into Pennsylvania for
the purpose of evading the laws of this State and then re-
turning, , it is a question of the utmost concern as to which
state shall have jurisdiction, or whether the guilty party
shall escape punishment entirely.
I shall treat the subject, first, briefly from an
international standpoint; second, as to the jurisdiction of
the United States Courts; and, lastly, as between the several
States of the Union.
It is a well established and fundamental principle
of criminal law in all civilized countries that crimes are
altogether local and cognizable and punishable only in the
place where they are committed. Lord Longborough maintained
2this view in the case of Folliot v Ogden, I H. T.1. 135. On
a writ of error in the same case, Mr. Justice Buller said:"It
is a geneaal principle that the penal laws of one country can-
not be taken notice of in another." Lord Ellenborough con-
firmed this view in Warrender v Warrender, 9 Biigh ll9. The
same doctrine is firmly rooted in the jurisprudence of Amer-
ica. Chief Justice Marshall in the case of The Antelope, 10
Wheat. 66, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"The courts of no country execute the penal ladys of another."
And Chief Zustice Spencer in Scoville v Confield, 14 Johns.
338, concurred in this view when he said: "The penal acts of
one state can have no operation in another state. They are
strictly local, and affect nothing more tnan they can reach."
This doctrine seemed to have its origin in a rude personifi-
cation of crime, and in the belief that it could only be aven-
ged in the place where the crime was committed.. Its force
can be traced in that provision of the Constitution of the
United States, Amendment VI, which reads: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and dist-
rict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which dist-
rict shall have been previously ascertained by law." But from
the fact that some places on the earth's surface are not
Jwithin the territorial jurisdiction of any coUntry, and that
some nations have not reached that degree of civilization
that would entitle them to be recognized as belonging to the
family of natiorns, and in other cases from prudential reasons,
there are some apparent exceptions to this general proposi-
tion which ve will proceeA to notice.
First, from an international standpoint.-- For a
long time offences comitted on the high seas and in barbar-
ous lands went unpunished, as there were no courts at the
place of the crime to take cognizance of the offence. It is
recorded that even during the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies buccaneers roamed the high seas, and brought unchallen-
ged and unmolested into English ports spoils which they had
taken from merchant vessels of other nations in times of
peace. But these unjust and piratical seizures were made the
subject of a statute under the reign of Henry VIII, whereby
offences committed on the high seas and in barbarous lands
were made punishable iy. England. And it is noa well settled
that an act committed on a public vessel on t.,e high seas,
whatever the nationality, in punishable in the state to which
the ship belongs, and if a private vessel, then each state has
control of its citizens on board, and can punish them for tine
crime there committed, or can yield jurisdiction to the state
wherein the owners have citizenship.
4These offences on the :iih seas can be conveniently
groupeJ into three classes: First, those committed on ship-
board, and punishable in the country of the flag; second, pi-
racies committed outside the territorial limits of any sove-r-
eign are by the lay of nations punishable in any civilized
country; third, those committed on the territorial waters of
a particular state while on board t~ie vessel of another state.
In regard to the third class, previous to 1676 both nations
gere assumed to have concurrent jurisdiction, but since then
the question has been much discussed, and is still in dispute.
The only rule in France is that they will not assert their
police power to punish crimes on foreign meochant vessels
wvithin their waters unless invoked by those on board, or un-
less liable to create some disturbance in their pirts. So
far as the law is settled in this regard it seems to be that
every nation has the right to enact such lays Ls she sees fit
in regard to regulating those on board her vessels in foreign
pirts. And at the same time they must respect the lays of
the country to which the port belongs and within whose jaris-
5iction they are.
As to offences committed in barbarous or semi-civ-
ilized lands against the citizen of a civilized state, they
are cognizable in the courts of the offended state, unless
by treaty stiPulations betwe.n them the consuls are given ju-
5dicial power to punish citizens of the country from which the
consul is sent for crimes committed in the foreign land. By
the 'Revised Statutes of the United States, #4084, in pursuance
of treaties with China, Japan, Siam, Egypt, and Madagascar,
our consuls there are fully empowered to arrange in the manner
provided all citizens of the United States charg-ed fith offen-
ces against law committed in such countries. And by #4088
this jurisdiction is claimed over islands or countries not
inhabited by any civilized country or recognized by any
treaty, and this extra-territorial jurisdiction over its cit-
izens is assumed without treaty authorization.
We next come to te question of the jurisdiction of
one country over the citizens of another -ilthin the border of
the first named country. It is a well settled rule of inter-
national law that offences against government, or which in-
volve the security and safety of the state, such as treason,
perjury before consuls, and forgery of government securities,
are justiciable in the country to which the offender owes cit-
izenship, no matter where the act is committed. It is equally
well established that it cannot invade the territory of ano-
ther state for the purpose of arresting the offender, but it
can demand extradition of him if treaty stipulations provide
for the same, though the state in which he is at the time has
concurrent jurisdiction. England goes ±rther than this and
6claimd jurisdiction of its citizens for hlomicide committed in
foreign countries. But for political offences it is gener-
ally accepted that no country will punish except tni '9 of-
fended, an t",or ord]inary crimes and misdemeanors committed by
a citizen of one country while witnin the territory of ano-
ther, the courts of the latter country have jurisIiction the
same as if committed by one of their o.vn citizens.
As to forgery of government securities, it would
work a great failure of justice to say that a citizen of the
United States could go over into Mexico and there issue forged
paper, and then come safely back into the United States and
dispose of the same, and not be liable to punishment here.
It would not only bring our government into contempt, but it
would expose us to spoliation. A like injurious effect would
result to our government and citizens were perjury before con-
suls abroad to be left to the foreign jurisdiction for pun-
ishment.
As to offenses committed by a party acting abroa
through a domestic agent, or through infra-territorial mechan-
ical agencies, the same rules should apply as between the dif-
ferent states of this country, and the question will be con-
sidered in that connection.
Next comes the jurisdiction of the United States
courts in criminal matters. Early in the present century, it
7was decided that theru vere no common law offeices against thii
United States. Even in 1807 Chief Justice Marshall in Ex
parte Rollman, 4 Cranch 75, said: "This court disclaims all
jurisdiction not given by t:e Constitution or the lays of the
United States. Courts which originate in the common law poss-
ess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by t .e common law
until some statute shall change their established principles;
but courts which are created by written law, and ahose juris-
diction is defined by -,ritten law, cannot transcend tuat ju-
risdiction." This doctrine, that had long been settled in
the public mind, was definitely decided by the Unites States
Supreme Court in United States v Hudson, 7 Cranch 32. The
United States government has such powers and only such powers
as are delegated to it by the Constitution. By Article I,
Section 8, of that instrument congress shall have power to de-
fine and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offenses against the law of nations. In accordance
with this Congress has declared that certain acts done on the
high seas or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven,
creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty or maritime juris-
diction of the United States, and without the jurisdcition of
'Nany particular state, shall be crimes against the United States
and punishable in its courts. Whether this grant of power to
the courts by Congress includes alcts committed on the Great
8Lakes has never been satisfactorily determined. It ,vas thoAht
by Justice Brown in Ex parte Byers, 32 Fed. Rep. 404, 410,
that the State courts had exclusive jurisdiction of crimes
committed on the American side of the boundary line of the
Great Lakes and their connecting waters, and that the Feder-
al courts had no jurisdiction of crimes committed on the Amer-
ican side of' the waters, as they were clearly not ,iithin the
meaning of Congress when it said high seas or any other arm of
tine sea, or in any river, haven, basin, or creek.
It is also provided by the Constitution, Section 3,
Article IV, that Congress shall have power over all the ter-
ritory or property belonging to the United States, and over
all places purchased by consent of the legislatures of the
States in which the same shall be for tihe erection of forts,
arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings. This pro-
vision was the cause of much litigation until the matter was
finally decided in Clay v State, 4 Kan. 49, and The People v
Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225. In the latter case a crime was com-
mitted within the boundary of Fort Niagara, and it was held
that the United States courts had no jurisdiction of the crime,
as no cession of such place had ever been made by the State
to the national government, though that government had had
control of the fort ever since the British had surre ndered
dominion of the same. The controlling principle se,-ms to be
that where the place is .itliin thre boundary of a State, and
9it has not been expressly excepted in the act admitting the
State into the Union, and where there has been no cession of
such place to the United States Government, then the State ana
not the Federal courts have jurisdiction.
We orill now consider how far the doctrine of extra-
territoriality has been extended as between the different
States of the American Union. It ,vould seem that here the
utmost liberality could be shown in this matter, from tre sim-
ilarity of conditions in the different States, and the gen-
erally prevailing public sentiment that no crime shall go un-
punished wherever committed. It is a universal doctrine thet
each State possesses power to provide for the punishment of
offences within its own limits, except such as the National
Constitution confers on the Federal Government. But at the
same time it cannot provide by legislation for the punishment
as crimes of acts committed beyond the State boundary, be-
cause such acts if offences at all are offences against the
sovereignty within whose limits they are committed. However
it is not necessary that the offender be corporally within
the State when the guilty act is done. Even when without the
limits of the State, if he is the agent or instrument through
whose unlawful acts consequences result that are injurious to
the State, then it seems that the offender can be punished as
effender against such State. Barkhunsted v Parsons, 3 Conn.
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People v Adams, 3 Denio 190, 210. It is as to tie extent arxd
limitations of this doctrine that disputes have arisen betveen
the different States. In an early case in Massachusetts,
Commonwealth v Green, 17 Mass. 540, the question was consider-
ed whether a conviction for felony in one State would have
any effect in preventing the convicted person from testify-
ing in another State. It was claimed by those endeavoring to
prevent this testimony from being given, that it came within
the provision of the United States Constitution that "every
2tate shall give due force and credit to judgments obtained in
other States," and as the judgment of felony prevented the
testimony from being given in that State, the Constitution
prevented its being given in any other State. But the testi-
mony was admitted, the court holding that the clause in the
Constitution applied only in civil cases, and that no State
could give effect to a criminal judgment in another State.
This question is no longer of importance, as the jury are now
allowed in most if not all of the States to weigh for what it
is worth the evidence of one who has been convicted of felony
even in that State.
As to larceny when the goods are stolen in one coun-
ty or State and carried by the thief into another county
or State, it is now universally admitted that the offense
can be punished in any county where the stolen goods are found,
ii
not that the offence was committed and completed in t le place
here the goods were taken, but that the offense is de4 to
continue and hang over tL~e offender in evury county into .Vhicii
the stolen Ioods are brought. This was even true at common
law when the goods wvre taken from one county in England to
another, but not when brought from a foreign country, or even
when brought from Scotland or Ireland, in the absence of
statute. Some early cases in this country holi with the Eng-
lish view, that the indictment could only be in the Statt
where tine :oods were stolen, that the States were foreign to
each other in this regard; but the later cases hold that the
thief can be indicted in any State in .iiich he takes ti:e
oods. Hamilton v State, 11 0. 435. State v Burnett, 14
Iowa 482. Commonwealth vWhite, 123 Mass. 433. A number of
states, as Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, Mary-
land, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Iowa, Oregon, and Ohio,
have claimed this right of jurisdiction when stolen goods
were brought within those States, even in tie absence of stat-
utory authority. In other States the right has been held not
to exist in the absence of statutory provision when the doods
are brought from some foreign country. Comnonwealth v Uprich-
ard, 3 Gray 434. But this has been decided the other way in
the case of The State v Bartlett, 11 Vt. 65, where an indict-
ment was held to lie in Vermont for oxen stolen in Canada,
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and brought into that State, an-, this case is upheld in The
State v Underwood, 49 Me. 181. In other States statutes have
been passed making the offence indictable here when goods are
brought from a foreign country, and such statutes have been
held constitutional. People v Burke, 11 Wend. 129. In Mich-
igan, t? e statute, which reads "stolen in any other State or
country," was held constitutional in People v Williams, 24
Mich. 157, where the goods were stolen in Louisiana and brought
into Michigan. Judge Cooley, writing the opini(,n of tie court,
said: "Now it may be true that this would not have been an
offense at common law, but that does not prevent its being
made so by statute." But in another Michigan case,--Morrisey
v People, 11 Mich. 327,--where the larceny was in Canada and
goods brought into Michigan, the same court was equally di-
vided as to the constitutionality of the act. This question
is well considered in a Massachusetts case,--Commonwealth v
Uprichard, supra,--decided in 1855, where a thief who had
stolen goods in Nova Scotia and brought them into that State
was held not indictable there. The judge tried to establish
a different principle from that when the goods are brought
from a sister State of the Union. The judge says: "This case
proceeds on the ground that the -,oods were actually stolen in
this State. It is only by assuming that bringing stolen goods
into t.is State from a foreign country makes the act larceny
here, that their allegations can be sustained, and this in-
volves the necessity of goin, to the law of Nova Scotia to
ascertain whether the act done was felonious, and consequent-
ly whether the goods were stolen. So it is by the combined
operation of the force of both la,,s that it is made felony
here. It is said they commit a new theft by the possession
of stolen goods in our jurisdiction. But what are stolen
goods? Are we to look to our own law or to txe law of iova
Scotia to determine? If Nova Scotia law is different from
ours, then we may be called on to punish as a crime that
which is innocent here. If we look to our law, then a taking
and carrying of goods in Nova Scotia under circumstances which
would not be criminal there might be punishable here. If
they can be indicted and punished here on the ground that
such g(ods were stolen where they were brought in, it seems
difficult to distinguish this from judicially enforcing and
carrying into effect the penal laws of another government."
In State v Underwood, 49 Me. 181, the court arrived at an op-
posite conclusion from an exactly similar state of facts,
three judges dissenting. The justice writing the opinion in
the case takes occasion to refer to the Massachusetts case
above cited, and considers the reasoning of Judge Shaw in that
case not well founded when he draws a distinction between a
sister State of this Union and a foreign country, from the
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fact that the different States are as sovereign and as inde-
pendent in their administration of criminal law as they are
in their relation with foreign governments. The laws of the
foreign country are not included among the elements which con-
stitute the crime for which the defandants were indicted.
Whether they were guilty of stealing the goods must be first
determined according to our laws concerning larceny, and if
they were thus guilty, then thie guilty possession of the goods
here was larceny here. As larceny is not an extraditable
crime with England, if Massachusetts doctrine prevailed then
thieves might steal with impunity in Canada, anL the border
States of this Country would become a refuge for tnem. In
neither Maine nor Massachusetts was there any statute on this
subject when these decisions were rendered. From the tenden-
cy of the decisions, then, I think it can be safely con-
eluded that an indictment for larceny will lie in any county
or State where the stolen goods are brought from another coun-
ty or State, and generally so held even in the absence of
a statute. When brought from a foreign country a few States
hold that the crime is not indictable here, though there seems
to be no substantial reason why this distinction should be
made.
The next class of cases is that by which a resident
of one State by means of false pretences through an innocant
agent in another State, or by means of forged checks or drafts
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sent into another State, succeeds in obtaining money in the
latter State. In Adams v People, I N. Y. 173, a resident of
Ohio obtained money in New York through tie representation of
an innocent agent residing here. The defendant ,vas heli lia-
ble and within the jurisdiction of New York, though never
within the State. The theory on which these cases are decided
is ti1at the crime is not consummated until the goods are ob-
tained. If the act had been complete when he procured tie
agent to act, thien Ohio law alone could punish. So if a man
in Michigan draws a forged check on a bank in New York, and
sends it here, the crime is not cc-nsufmated until the check
is received, and hence punishable in the latter place. People
v Rathbun, 1 Wend. 50-. Lindsey v The State, 36 0. St. 509.
WAfhere an accessory before tie fact is o~jtside the
jurisdiction where the crims is committed, the ,veight of au-
thority seems to be that the accessory can only be punished
where his guilty act took place. State v Chapin, 7 Ark. 561.
State v 7!yckoff, 31 N. J. L. 65. John v State, l Ind. 421.
State v Moore, 26 N. H. 448. These cases proceed on the prin-
ciple that the guilty act is completed in the State where the
act of aiding or abetting is done, and hence punishable there,
while the guilty agent, who is the principal, is punishable in
the State where the act is cwiitted. The courts of Connec-
ticut take a decided stand the other way, as expressed in the
case of The State v Grady, 34 Conn. l7i., where Grady con-
spired with certain accomplices in t ,e City of New York to
commit the crime of larceny in Connecticut. The defense was
C-O)1T tS
tiiat the Connecticut had no jurisdiction to try those who
participated in the plot in New York. The court says: "The
general proposition tviat no man is to suffer criminally for
that done outside the jurisdiction applies only ,ihen tn.e act
is completed outside t -e country. It is the highest injustice
that a man should be protected from doing a criminal act be-
cause he is personaliy out of the State. The doctrine is
that as an accessory he must be pursued in the locality where
he committed the enticement, but this has never been recog-
nized in this State; is inconsistent with our system of crim-
inal law, and does not commend itself to our judgment; that
the doctrine originated as Bishop says in t=ie blunder of some
judge, an. that it is vicious and inapplicable in this coun-
try." These cases are to be distinguished from those wherein
the agent is an innocent party, and it is to be notea that
although an accessory before tie fact is now punishable as a
principal in most of the States, the same rales apply as when
the technical term was used.
There has been much difference of opinion in the
courts of this country as to which county or State has juris-
diction when a mortal blow is struck in one county or State
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and death ensues in another. It is now well settled by tie
weight of authority that Thi-re the blow is given in one county
and death results in another county in same State, that the
offense is committed where the blow is given. State v Gassert,
21 Minn. 369. State v Bowen, 16 Kansas 475. Riley v State,
9 Humph. 646. U. S. v Guiteau, I 1!1ackey 49o. Green v State,
66 Ala. 40.
However statutes have been upheld in some States
making the act punishable in either State, and some of tne
States have enacted treat where death occurs ,ithin tie State
from a mortal wound -,iven, cr ot,:.er violence or injury in-
flicted, without the State, that the offence is triable in
the State .There death occurs. Tyler v People, 8 Micn. 320.
Comrnon vealtn v lacloon, 101 Mass. 1. The last case gives an
exhaustive review of the authorities, English and American,
and arrives at the conclusion that the statutes giving juris-
diction where death occurs are constitutional, and strongly
intimates t>-at tie same vould be true even in the absence of
statute. But tne more logical view .hen no statute intervenes,
and the one better sustained by the authorities to-day, is
found in the opinion of thae judge in The State v Bowen, 6 Kan.
475. lie says: "It seems to us reasonable to hold tnat as tne
only act the defendant does toward causing the death is in
giving the fatal blow, the place 'where he does it is tie
place where he commits the crime, and that the subsequent
wanderings of the injured party uninfluenced by the defendant
do not give an ambulatory character to tne crime, at least
that those movements do not, unless under express warrant of
statute, change the place of offence; and while it may beftrue
that the crime is not completed until death, yet that death
simply determines the character of the crime committed in
giving the blow, and refers back and modifies tilat act."
Where place of death has jurisdiction, it is not because it is
regarded as having been committed there, but because some
rule of law, statutory or otherwise, confers jurisdiction.
The modern and more rational view is that the crime is commit-
ted where the unlawful act is ione.
Another class of cases somewhat similar to those
already noticed is where one without the State does an act to
take effect within the State, as when one fires a gun, or
sends a poisonous compound, or an explosive package, or di-
verts or swells the course of a stream, or publishes a libel-
lous letter, any one of which is to produce its ultimate and
injurious result, not where tue perpetrator was, but where the
act took effect. In all these cases the act was committed and
punishnent should be had where the criminal act took effect.
It was not completed in any other jurisdiction, and the evi-
Jence and effect of the crime comm-itted can both be inquired
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into wh r the act was consummated. For authorities on this
point see Stillman v Vhite Rock Co., 3 Wood & M. 538; Common-
wealth v Blanding, 3 Pick. 304; Connonwealth v Smith, 11 Ali-n
243; Commonwealth v Macloon, 101 Mass. 1; People v Adams, 3
Denio 190; R. v Garrett, 6 Cox 260; Robbin v State, 8 Ohio St.
131.
A concurrent jurisdiction is sometimes held to ex-
ist in the country where the act or conspiracy is planned.
Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. I, 4279, 208.
It would seem that when the act is done in a for-
eign country and takes effect in this co-Lntry the same rules
are applicable, though the offender is not personally amenable
to our laws till he comes within their jurisdiction. R. v
Marley, 1 Cox 104; R. v James, 4 Cox 198.
It has come to be a question of considerable impor-
tance whether a State can punish for the crime of bigamy
where the second marriage took place in another jurisdiction.
In the absence of a statute giving a State jurisdiction for
an extra-territorial crime we know of no decision holding that
the State has power to punish for the bigamy committed in
another State. This question is carefully considered in the
case of Dickson v Dickson, 24 Am. Dec. 444, where a woman
married in Kentucky, and afterwards abandoned her husband,
and he obtained a divorce, and she was forbid:ien to marry
_0
again. She soon afterwards went ovur into Tennessee and mar-
ried Dickson who soon died, ZfnlJ she claimed dower which was
resisted by the heirs. The case came up in Tennessee, and
the judge in his (,pinion said: "Had she come into tftis State
ani married Dickson before divorce, she would have been guilty
of bigamy, for it mattered not where the first marria,)e took
place, if legal in the country where solemnized, second mar-
riage in Tennessee sould be bigamous. I have endeavored to
fina some legal principle that would avoid the second mar-
riage, but I am unable to do so. She was freed from all mar-
ried relations in Kentucky, but subject to all the pains and
penalties as to bigamy as if former marriage was still good;
but the State of Kentucky cannot complain because her penal~y
laws cannot extend beyond her own territorial jurisdiction.
Not punishable in Tennessee, because no Tennessee lall has been
violated. Not for bigamy in Tennessee, because no former
husband living. No principle of comity among neighboring
States can be extended to give force and effect to tne penal
la':is of one society extra-territorial to the other, and for
many reasons it would be equally inconvenient, not to say im-
practicable, to adopt the principle among sister States of
the American Union, for which this bourt has the conclusive
authority of the United States Supreme Court." HIouston v
loore, 5 Wheat. 68; Earthmore v Jones, 2 Yerger 40 6 .
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Two cases in New York illustrate the same principle.
In Van Voorhis v Brintnall, 66 N. Y. 18, a marriage between
A and B had been dissolved on account of tne adultery of B,
the husband, and he was forbidden to marry again. Then B. and
C, she also livin{ in this State, went over into Connecticut
and were married, and returned at once to this State. The
second marriage -gas held valid, and the children of their mar-
would share
riage~with those of the first in a devise. The judge says:
"Examples of legislation are not wanting making an act commit-
ted out of the State punishable within the State by special
provision of law. Such is our law against duelling and stolen
goods. But in the very next section on bigamy there is no
such enlargement of the statute. Why expressly charged in
duelling laws, etc., if it could be applied in other cases?"
The same principle is applied in Thorp v Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602.
The law seeming to be thus settled where no statute controls,
we will next consider the effect of statutes making bigamy
punishable whenever the ,-uilty one is apprehended in the State,
no matter where the bigamous act -,as committed. This question
arose in Wells v The State, 32 Ark. 563, under a statute of
that State which reads: "An indictment may be found against
a person for a second marriage in any county in wnich such
person may be apprehended, and like proceediings had as if the
offense had been committed therein, the venue being immaterial.
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The court says: "The legislature has no more power to pro-
vide that a man be indicted !or higamy in any count g in which
he may be apprehended, r,,qardless of the county in z-hich the
offense may have been committed, than it has to make a like
provision as to murder or any other crime. The constitutiona]l
provision is the p -ramoLuit law and cannot be disregarded.
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy tile
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of
the county in which the crime shall have been committed."
A similar statute in England would have been within the power
of Parliament, because Parliament is not limited by ritten
constitution as legislatures are in this country."
A similar conclusion was reached in the case of
The State v Cutshall, 15 S. E. 261, a N. C. case, wherein the
statute reads that "if any person being married shall marry
any other person during the life time of the former husband
or rife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place
in North Carolina or elsewhere, every such offender shall be
guilty of a felony, and every such offense may be punished in
the county where the offender shall be apprehended as if ac-
tually committed there." This statute was declared unconsti-
tutional by the h ighest court of that State, as denying a
right of trial by a jury of the mizag in all cases which
were so triable at common law, and in violation of the provi-
''3
sion that no person shall be imprisoned o- disseized of his
liberties but by the law of the land. The statute, as will be
seen by its terms, applies as well to a citizen of another
State who in transit through t 'e State affords an opportunity
to the local authorities to apprehend him, as to those who be-
come domiciled within its borders; and this attempt to evade
the organic la-r of the land, which guaranties to citizens of
all the States the privileges and immunities of the citizens
of the several States, and which under the inter-state com-
merce clause gives them the right to pass through any State
without arrest and inquiry into their accountability for offen-
ces against another sovereignty, is too palpable a violation
of fundamental rights to be sanctioned by any court. Even if
the citizen went over into South Carolina, and married with
intent to evade the laws of North Carolina, and immediately
returned to that State, the lay of the latter State cannot
punish for the bigamous act was tkully and completely committed
in another State, and could by tne organic law of the State
and nation only be tried t2.ere by a jury of the vicinage.
Had the statute been limited to. persons .ithin tu-e State who
have a husband or vife living, and who shall marry another
person without the State, and shall afterwards cohabit with
such person within the State, and making the felony consist
not in the bigamous marriage in anothier State, but in the con-
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tinuous cohabiting ,vithin the State, then it would have been
Clearly constitutional as providing for a crime committed
within the State. This latter view has been maintained in
Commonwealth v Bradley, 2 Cush. 553; Bremer v State, 59 Ala.
102; State v Palmer, 18 Vt. 570; State v Fitzgerald, 75 Mo.
571. As expressed in Brcmer v State, supra, "Our statute on
this subject covers two crimes; one of them, the offense of
bigamy, can be punished only where the unlawful marriage is
solemnized; the other is complete and punishable in any coun-
ty in which the parties continue to cohabit afterwards."
The statute in New York is broad and general in its
terms, and it has not yet been decided whether it includes the
act of continuous cohabitation in this State after a second
marriage in another State, the first husband or wife being
still living, and no divorce having been obtained by either
party. Where a divorce has been granted and one party has
been forbidden to marry again, it has been -Aecided in t.io com-
paratively recent cases that the party so forbidden can go
over into another State and re-marry, and return at once to
this State without fear of conviction. Van Voorhis v Brint-
nall, 86 N. Y. 18; Thorp v Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602.
The statute in New York,--Section 676 of Penal Code
is as follows: "A person alho comnits an act without this
State which affects persons or property within this State, or
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if' committed within this State would be a crime, is punisiable
as if the act were comitted within this State." In vie ,v of
The decisions in the two cases above mentioned, it is extreme-
ly doubtful whether it was within the intention of the legis-
lature to make punishable by this Statute acts of continuous
habitation here, when the second marriage was in another State
even though there had been no divorce from the first marriage.
Statutes extending the penal jurisdiction of a State are to
be strictly construed, and are to cover nothing more than
their terms clearly import. As Chief Justice Marshall says
in United States v Fisher, 2 Cranch 369: "Where rights are
infringed, where the general systems of the laws is departed
from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irre-
sistible clearness to induce a court of justice to support a
aesign to effect such object."
In all these cases of conflicting jurisdiction,
State, national, or international, the question of extrati-
tion is closely connected with that of extra-territoriality.
Whether a State should extradite an accused person, or retain
and punish him for a crime committed outside its jurisdiction,
or allow him to remain in the State unpunished, ,iill depend
on the nature of the crime, the proximity of the one State to
the other, and thie jegree of civilization in each as evidenced
by the prevailing sentiment regarding the punisrnent of criae.
It would seem as a matter of justice and humanity
that a State should either surrender a fugitive from justice,
or else retain and punish lim for a crime committed elsewthere
if cognizable by t eir law, and not allow him to remain a
free thou h gIuilty man, thus menacing the security of the
State, and inviting crime by the easy means of escape from
punishment.
In other words extra-territoriality should be the
complement of extradition,--the one beginning where the other
ends.

